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in these areas, it should impel a similar result in the area
under consideration.3 1
In admitting declarations against penal interest the
court might possibly be preserving for an innocent defend-
ant the only evidence available to assure his acquittal. It
is submitted that the admission of such statements, under
the safeguards set forth in the Brady case, will more often




Cooper-Merriken Fertilizers, Inc. v. Smith'
Mortgagee and mortgagor entered into a written agree-
ment for a public sale of the chattels covered by the mort-
gage. The property was to be sold by a third party in the
mortgagor's name and the proceeds held for the benefit of
the mortgagee. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the mort-
gagor, obtained summary judgment and subsequently levied
an attachment on the property. The mortgagee then peti-
tioned and was given leave to intervene in the proceedings
to protect its lien, which it claimed to be superior to any
claim of the judgment creditor. The Circuit Court for Kent
County, in a Memorandum Opinion, held that the mort-
gagee did not lose its lien since the third party auctioneer
was acting as a trustee for the mortgagee and not as agent
of the mortgagor.
There are three types of agreements entered into by
mortgagor and mortgagee in which the problem of the
principal case may arise. First, the mortgagee may uncon-
ditionally consent to the selling of the property by the
mortgagor in the mortgagor's name. It is undisputed that
in such a situation the mortgagee loses his lien, and an at-
"Declarations against penal interest have occasionally been admitted
in civil cases on the theory that the crime also subjected the declarant to
tort liability and was therefore against his pecuniary interest. See e.g.,
Weber v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.' Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) ;
Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284, 162 A.L.R. 437 (1945).
If this is a basis for admissibility in civil cases, the same should also
hold true in criminal cases. The reliability factor is the same, and the
necessity would be even greater since the life of the criminal defendant
could very possibly be dependent on the admission of this type of evi-
dence.
I Daily Record, November 17, 1962 (Md. 1962).
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taching judgment creditor prevails.2 Second, the mortgagee
may consent to the sale of the property by the mortgagor
in the mortgagor's name, but on condition that the proceeds
of the sale be applied to the mortgage debt. In such a situa-
tion, some courts have found the mortgagor to be the agent
of the mortgagee,3 or have found an equitable assignment
from mortgagor to mortgagee,4 and have upheld the mort-
gagee's lien as superior to claims of others. Other courts,
however, have held that the mortgagee loses his lien be-
cause the attaching party is without knowledge of the
mortgage agreement.' The third type of agreement, the
one used in the instant case, is one which states that a third
party is to sell the property in the mortgagor's name and
apply the proceeds to the mortgage debt. Although a prob-
lem of first impression in Maryland, other jurisdictions
have consistently held that the mortgagee, in the absence
of fraud, prevails over the attaching judgment creditor.'
This result has been said to be based upon the argument
that such a third person receives the proceeds, not as the
agent of the mortgagor, but as trustee for the mortgagee,
and that as soon as the proceeds reach the trustee's
hands they become subject to the trust.7 Accordingly, he is
under no obligation to pay them over to the mortgagor, nor
can the latter collect them from him, and the garnishing
creditor, acquiring no greater rights, cannot recover the
proceeds from the garnishee.
In the instant case, the form of agreement thus fur-
nished the mortgagee with an effective means of fore-
closure on the mortgage debt without the necessity of any
formal proceedings, and without the general public having
knowledge that the sale was a foreclosure.
At common law the method of securing payment from
a defaulting mortgagor was by strict foreclosure. The mort-
2 Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Calhoun, 37 S.D. 542, 159 N.W.
127 (1916); ANNO. 36 A.L.R. 1379, 1383-1384 (1925); Johnson v. Tuttle,
108 Vt. 291, 187 A. 515 (1936).
3 Farmers' State Bank of Petersburg v. Anderson, 112 Neb. 413, 199
N.W. 728 (1924).
'McIntyre v. Hauser, 131 Cal. 11, 63 P. 69 (1900).
Smith v. Clarke, 100 Iowa 605, 69 N.W. 1011 (1897) ; -Smith v. Crawford
County State Bank, 99 Iowa 282, 61 N.W. 378, 68 N.W. 690 (1894); First
National Bank v. Bernard, 30 S.W. 580 (Texas 189).
aAcme Feeds, Inc. v. Daniel, 312 Il. App. 330, 38 N.E. 2d 530 (1941);
Hoyt v. Clemans, 167 Iowa 330, 149 N.W. 442 (1914) ; Wilson v. Geiss,
153 Minn. 211, 190 N.W. 61 (1922); Farmers State Bank v. Kavanaugh
& Shea, 98 Okla. 119, 224 P. 525 (1924); Minneapolis Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Calhoun, 8upra, n. 2; Chapman v. Allen, 115 V:t. 202, 55 A. 2d 125
(1947).
1 ANNo., 36 A.L.R. 1379, 1390 (1925).
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gagee would bring a bill in equity calling upon the mort-
gagor to repay the debt. The court, after a hearing, would
pass a decree appointing a day for payment. Upon failure
of payment the decree would be made final and absolute
and have the effect of vesting full title in the mortgagee
without any sale necessarily occurring.' It was necessary
that all interested parties or persons who might be affected
by the decree be joined as parties in the foreclosure pro-
ceeding so that their interests might be finally determined.9
Strict foreclosure is not generally used in the United States
today, except where (1) the property is similar in value to
the mortgage debt or (2) where a special foreclosure pro-
ceeding is required against a subsequent lienor.10 These
situations would appear to be instances where the mort-
gagee would not be concerned with extinguishing the rights
of third persons, either because third parties could not pos-
sibly have any interest worth protecting, or because a
separate suit would, in any event, be later brought to fore-
close third parties' interests."
In order to find a quicker and less expensive method of
enforcing mortgages and also to bring the foreclosure sale
under the jurisdiction of the court, legislative changes were
enacted, beginning in Maryland as early as 1784.12 The
current version of these statutory reforms 3 permits the
insertion of a clause in the mortgage agreement either pro-
viding for the mortgagor's assent to the passing of a decree
for sale of the property upon default by the mortgagor 14
or authorizing some person to sell the property upon de-
fault.' 5 Foreclosure under these methods, called "assent to
a decree" and "power of sale" respectively, requires that
an action be brought in equity" but does not necessitate
issuance or service of process, filing an answer, or holding
a hearing. 17 Before a sale can occur, the mortgagee must
' Ex Parte in the Matter of Aurora Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, 223 Md. 135, 136, 162 A. 2d 739 (1960) ; .MLLEa, EQUITY PROCEURE
(1897) § 446, pp. 527-528; 15 M.L.E., Mortgages § 211.
9Waring v. Nat'l Say. & T. Co., 138 Md. 367, 379, 114 A 57 (1921);
Warfield v. Ross, 38 Md. 85, 90 (1873) ; MiiLia, op. cit. supra, n. 8, § 62,
p. 75; 15 M.L.E., Mortgages § 214, WALsH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 68, p. 284.
"WALSH, op. cit. supra, n' 9, § 65, pp. 274-275.
Id., § 67, p. 278.
Ex Parte in the Matter of Aurora Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion, supra, n. 8, 136-7; 15 M.L.E., Mortgages § 211.
M3 AID. RULES, W70-W77.
1" Id., W70 1.
15 Id., W70 3.
"6 Id., W72 b.
7 Id., W72 d.
COOPER-MERRIKEN v. SMITH
post a bond with the court 8 and the person authorized to
sell must advertise the sale.'9 If a third party has an inter-
est in the property, he may apply to the court ratifying the
sale and the court will distribute as much as is available
from the surplus of the sale to satisfy his claim.2" Since the
sale is under the jurisdiction of the court it would appear
that the possibility of the mortgagee perpetrating a fraud
on the rights of interested third parties is minimal.
No such advantage is present in the foreclosure method
presented in the instant case, as neither the court nor the
general public would know a foreclosure sale is transpiring.
However, the very absence of general notoriety makes a
more difficult practical problem of proving that a fraud has
occurred. Furthermore, even if the mortgagee respects the
rights of third parties, he would necessarily expend time
and money searching records in an effort to discover all
those who may have an interest in the mortgaged property.
On the other hand, several distinct advantages are pre-
sented by utilizing the type of transaction employed in the
instant case. The private sale saves the expenses of formal
court proceedings, including the bond required to be posted,
thus leaving a greater surplus remaining for the mortgagor
and claims of third persons. Also, a private sale is likely
to realize a higher selling price than a court-supervised
foreclosure sale. If the auctioneer at the sale is to be con-
sidered as a trustee for not only the mortgagee but all
other interested parties as well, then the possibility of
fraud being perpetrated by the mortgagee is unlikely.21
BERRiL A. SPEERT
18 Id., W74 al.
'Id., W74 a2.
20 Id., W75 a.
21 See cases supra, ns. 6 and 7, wherein the auctioneer is described as a
trustee for the mortgagee, but no mention is made whether the
auctioneer also is representing the interests of other parties that may be
involved. The cases do not discuss the duty of 'the trustee, if any, to
determine whether there is an absence of fraud on the part of the mort-
gagee before turning the proceeds of the sale over to him.
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